The 2014 European Elections. The Case of Poland by Sula, Piotr
www.ssoar.info
The 2014 European Elections. The Case of Poland
Sula, Piotr
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Sula, P. (2014). The 2014 European Elections. The Case of Poland. Studia Politica: Romanian Political Science
Review, 14(3), 395-406. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-445354
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-ND Lizenz
(Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Keine Bearbeitung) zur
Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden
Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-ND Licence
(Attribution-Non Comercial-NoDerivatives). For more Information
see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
 The 2014 European Elections  
The Case of Poland 
 
PIOTR SULA 
 
 
 
Introduction 
  
This article presents the conduct and consequence of the election to the 
European Parliament held in Poland on 25 May 2014. It is a commonly 
accepted view that elections are inherent in the democratic order. Members of 
the European Parliament are elected following a similar procedure to that 
governing the elections to national Parliaments. Probably as widespread is the 
opinion that, since they do not result in the election of the executive branch of 
government, European elections are of less significance to the competing parties 
– which appear to prioritise their participation in the future government – than 
the competition for seats in the national parliament. As a consequence, the 
lesser impact of the decisions made at the ballot box is also translated into a less 
intense interest in the European elections expressed by the electorate. For this 
reason, elections to the European Parliament are often referred to as a second-
order election1. 
Irrespective of the significance attached to European Parliament 
elections, Polish citizens tend to be generally positive about the functioning of 
this institution. In fact, according to the results of the 2013 Eurobarometer 
survey, 51% of the Polish respondents expressed their trust in the EU 
Parliament in November 2013, a result which considerably exceeded the 
European average (39%) and ranked Poland 12th in terms of the level of trust in 
this institution. It is also worth pointing out that the EU Parliament enjoyed 
greater trust of Poles than many of their home institutions did, including those 
                                                 
1
 Simon Hix, Michael Marsh, “Second-Order Effects Plus Pan-European Political Swings: 
An Analysis of European Parliament Elections Across Time”, Electoral Studies,vol. 30, 
issue 1, 2011, pp. 4-5; Sara B. Hobolt, Jae-Jae Spoon, “Motivating the European Voter: 
Parties, Issues and Campaigns in European Parliament Elections”, European Journal of 
Political Research,vol.51, Issue 6, 2012, p. 701; Marzena Cichosz, “Pozycjonowanie 
oferty wyborczej partii politycznych jako mechanizm strategiczny”, Robert Alberski, 
Radosław Solarz (eds.)Wybory do Parlamentu Europejskiego w 2009 roku w okręgu 
dolnośląsko-opolskim. Uwarunkowania kształtowania strategii wyborczych, 
Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, Wrocław, 2011, p. 95. 
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fostering the highest levels of trust, i.e., the media (the above survey showed the 
following to have earned the greatest trust of Polish people: radio – 57%, 
television – 53%, press – 48%, Internet – 45%). The European Union as a 
whole managed to win the trust of 45% of Poles, as compared with 19% and 
17% of trust placed in the Polish government and Parliament, respectively2.  
As a rule, Poles do not question the significance of their country’s 
membership of EU structures, with their support for the EU peaking on the 
tenth anniversary of Poland’s accession to the European Union, which also 
corresponded with the third elections to the European Parliament participated in 
by Polish political parties. As is indicated by research conducted on a regular 
basis by the Public Opinion Research Centre (CBOS), the Poland of 2014 
enjoys its citizens’ almost uniform approval of EU membership: in March 2014, 
its supporters amounted to as many as 89% of respondents, whereas opponents 
were a mere 7% of the sample. Similar results were obtained in 2007 – 89% of 
respondents declared their support for Poland’s EU membership, while only 5% 
were against it. 
Among the most important advantages of being a member of the EU 
indicated by respondents were the opening up of borders and freedom of 
movement (31%), financial benefits in the form of EU funds (30%), extensive 
agricultural subsidies (13%), and impulse to economic growth (10%). As the 
study was conducted in 2014, in the face of the military conflict between 
Ukraine and Russia, a proportion of respondents (5%) emphasised the role of 
national security that Poland enjoys due to its membership of the EU. 
  
The major threats and disadvantages indicated by respondents as arising 
out of Poland’s accession to the EU included excessive bureaucracy (12%), 
limited sovereignty of the state resulting from the necessity to comply with top-
down decisions of the EU (8%), the need for adapting Polish law to EU regulations 
(6%), and making the Polish economy dependent on foreign capital (5%)3. 
The above observations make it justified to argue that, with respect to 
issues concerning the place of Poland in Europe, there is little potential for 
heated debate and fierce campaigns inasmuch as Polish elections to the 
European Parliament are concerned. However, despite a sweeping majority of 
Polish society declaring itself to be in favour of their country’s membership of 
the EU, there still exists a group of respondents who stressed the disadvantages 
of joining it. The Eurosceptics, who were relatively few in number among the 
country’s political elites, appealed to this group of voters and, as a result, 
                                                 
2
 Standardowy Eurobarometr 80. Opinia publiczna w Unii Europejskiej, Jesień 2013, TNS 
Opinion &Social. Raport krajowy – Polska, http://ec.europa.eu/polska/news/140226_ 
eurobarometr_pl.htm, accessed on 27 September 2014, pp. 5-6.  
3
 10 lat członkostwa Polski w Unii Europejskiej, Komunikat z badań, NR 52/2014, CBOS, 
Warszawa 2014, pp. 2, 9-10, 11, www.cbos.pl, accessed on 27 September 2014. 
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undermined the consensus that the elites had previously built about Poland’s 
membership of the EU. 
 
 
The Legal Framework for Elections  
to the European Parliament in Poland 
 
Elections to the European Parliament in Poland are governed by the 
provisions of the Act of 5 January 2011 – The Electoral Code, which replaced 
the previously binding electoral regulations that had been in force since 23 
January 20044. Under the Electoral Code, candidates for deputies to the 
European Parliament can be nominated by electoral committees of political 
parties, electoral committees of a coalition (consisting of two or more political 
parties), and electoral committees of voters (formed by at least 15 citizens). 
Lists of candidates are submitted to constituency electoral commissions, which 
register them as constituency lists. Such lists, submitting between five and ten 
candidates each, must be supported by at least 10.000 voters who permanently 
reside in a given electoral constituency. The country is divided into 13 
constituencies that cover the area of a province, two provinces, or part of a 
province, as is the case of the capital city of Warsaw and Mazovia Province.  
An electoral committee may not exceed the expenditure limit on election 
campaigning calculated as the sum of 0.60 PLN (~ 0.14 EUR) on each voter 
included in the register of voters for a given constituency. Electoral committees 
may accept funds for electoral agitation from natural persons (limited up to 15 
times the national minimum wage; in 2014, the limit was set to 25.200 PLN, 
i.e., ~ 6,031 EUR) and from candidates for deputies to the European Parliament 
(the limit, specified as 45 times the national minimum wage, was set in 2014 to 
75.600 PLN, i.e., ~ 18,094 EUR). Furthermore, committees may obtain the 
funds by taking out bank loans, while political parties may fund their committees 
from their own resources pursuant to the Act of 1997 on political parties. 
Electoral committees that have won at least one seat in the European 
Parliament are eligible for reimbursement of the expenditure incurred within so-
called “subjective” donations. The donation is calculated according to the 
following formula: 
The amount of the donation cannot exceed a given committee’s total 
expenditure on election campaigning.  
Taking into account the method for calculating subjective donations, one 
cannot help but wonder why political parties are so devoted to mobilising the 
public to participate in the election. In other words, rather than striving for a 
                                                 
4
 Ustawa z dnia 5 stycznia 2011 r. – Kodeks wyborczy, www.pkw.gov.pl, accessed on 14 
October 2014. 
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broader voter participation, which would translate into a higher level of 
legitimisation of the European Parliament, it may be the case that political 
parties are equally concerned about the amount of donation, as it depends on the 
number of valid votes.  
It is also worth emphasising that seats are distributed only among the 
committees that have received at least 5% of public support nationally. The 
distribution of seats is based on the d’Hondt method. 
Another issue that is significant for the legal principles governing 
elections to the European Parliament in Poland is the possibility offered to 
electoral committees with respect to the presentation of their programmes in 
public media. Each committee that has registered constituency lists in at least 
half of the electoral constituencies is awarded the right to broadcast its election 
materials free of charge on nationwide channels of radio and television, whereas 
each committee that has registered at least one electoral constituency list is 
given such a right with regard to regional channels. The total airtime for 
broadcasting election materials on nationwide channels is limited to 15 hours of 
broadcast on Polish television from 5 p.m. to 11 p.m., and to 20 hours of 
broadcast by Polish Radio. Airtime for broadcasting materials on regional 
television and radio channels is limited to 10 and 20 hours, respectively. 
Airtime for broadcasting election materials is divided into equal parts among 
the committees that have registered their lists in at least half of the electoral 
constituencies, while in the case of the committees that have registered their 
lists in less than half of the constituencies, airtime is divided proportionally 
according to the number of constituency lists registered. 
Following the definition of the legal principles governing electoral 
competition, I shall now proceed to describe the election campaign and present 
the parties competing in the election to the European Parliament in Poland. 
 
 
Election Campaign to the European Parliament 
 
Dominated for the last seven years by two major parties, the political 
situation in Poland on the eve of the 2014 election to the European Parliament 
was a stable one. The competitors were Civic Platform (PO), co-ruling since 
2007, and the opposing Law and Justice (PiS) (see the Appendix, Table 1). Two 
other parties enjoyed the stable support of the electorate: Democratic Left 
Alliance (SLD) and the Polish Peasant Party (PSL).  
It has commonly been assumed that the 2014 election campaign was run 
in the shadow of the Russia-Ukraine conflict and its consequences for Poland 
and Europe. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that the politicians laid particular 
emphasis on the issues concerning international politics and national security of 
the country. In its election spots, PO argued that the ruling party was the only 
one to ensure the safety of Polish citizens, as it was Donald Tusk, the then 
prime-minister, who maintained strong relationships with the political leaders of 
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France, Germany, and the United States, i.e., the countries of key significance to 
the functioning of NATO – the main guarantor of Poland’s security. In fact, in 
one of those spots the prime-minister expressly stated that “what is really at 
stake in these elections is the national security of Poland”. This and a number of 
similar declarations led multiple commentators to believe that Donald Tusk inspired 
a sense of threat in the public in order to present himself more convincingly as a 
statesman capable of leading Poland to safety. It was precisely such elements, 
which featured extensively in PO’s campaign, that made SLD claim that the 
incumbent party had come to resemble PiS more than ever before.  
The salience of the international situation and security was indisputable. 
Nevertheless, the two largest actors on the Polish political scene conducted their 
campaigns with the primary focus on the negative: in line with the strategies 
they had been following for several years, the electoral committees of both PO 
and PiS indulged in pointing out the failures, negligence, and mistakes of their 
competitors. In addition, PO also took advantage of presenting their 
achievements as the incumbent party and underlined the opportunities that 
supporting it in the election to the European Parliament would create.  
When commenting on the election campaign, it is worth pointing out that 
both committees with the highest chances of winning (PiS and PO) prepared 
election TV spots that turned out to follow similar conventions and share a 
number of similarities in terms of graphic design5. PiS used its spot to denounce 
several of PO’s deputies to the European Parliament who, according to the 
authors of the film, failed to represent Poland with dignity, and instead brought 
disgrace upon their homeland. Those considered to be worthy of such 
condemnation were: former vice-president of the European Parliament, Jacek 
Protasiewicz, who came into conflict with customs officers of Frankfurt airport 
while under the influence of alcohol; the Minister of Finance, Jacek Rostowski, 
who was claimed to be responsible for increasing the external debt of the 
country; the Minister of Administration and Digitization, Michał Boni, who 
insisted on Poland’s signing of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 
(ACTA), which was perceived as posing a threat to freedom of using the 
Internet; and MEP Michał Kamiński – the “traitor” who abandoned PiS and was 
counted among MEPs to most frequently leave the meetings of the European 
Parliament before the end. 
In response to that move, PO created a film entitled The Bringers of 
Shame, which, not unlike the original, also criticised its competitors by name: 
Adam Hofman, who bragged about the measurements of his penis to female 
employees; deputy Karol Karski, whom a Cypriot court found guilty of 
destroying hotel property; and deputy Krystyna Pawłowicz, who did not hesitate 
to call the flag of the European Union a “rag”. The above catalogue of 
                                                 
5
 The similarity was so striking that when I showed the spots of PO and PiS during a lecture 
delivered at the Comenius University in Bratislava, my colleagues and the students of the 
Department of Political Science supposed that they both must have been produced by one 
advertising agency. 
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behaviour which PO found to have brought shame on Poland was crowned by a 
PiS-organised manifestation during which the EU was compared to a 
concentration camp: the participants of the march carried a banner reading 
“Konzentration Lager Europa”.  
The two dominant parties were not efficiently challenged by the smaller 
ones – Left Democratic Alliance (SLD) and the Polish Peasant Party (PSL). The 
situation of the former was complicated by the clash over the monopoly on 
representing leftist circles that occurred between SLD and Palikot’s Movement 
(RP) led by Janusz Palikot. The conflict was further intensified in February 
2013 when Aleksander Kwaśniewski, former president of the Republic of 
Poland, who had remained close to SLD for many years, supported the initiative 
of Marek Siwiec (deputy to the European Parliament, who left the party at the 
end of 2012) and Janusz Palikot. The three politicians declared their aspiration 
to unite Polish centre-left parties, thus inviting members of SLD to cooperate. 
At the same time, they announced that Ryszard Kalisz, a member of SLD and 
former Chief of President Kwaśniewski’s Chancellery, had already received and 
accepted such an invitation. As a consequence of this event, Kalisz was expelled 
from SLD in April 2013. 
A breakthrough in the process of institutionalising the cooperation 
between former SLD politicians and RP was made in March 2013 with the 
registration of Europa Plus Social Movement. Changes were also introduced to 
Palikot’s party, which was renamed Your Movement (TR) in October 2013. 
Notably, Marek Siwiec and Ryszard Kalisz joined the ranks of party members 
and in so doing heightened tensions between SLD and TR only further.  
The initiative aiming to unite centre-left parties posed a serious threat to 
SLD, especially given the support of the still-popular ex-president Aleksander 
Kwaśniewski. It appears justified to argue that these ambitious plans of Europa 
Plus were thwarted by a single conference, namely one held in April 2013, 
during which Kwaśniewski appeared to many observers as being under the 
influence of alcohol. This attracted rather fierce criticism, especially as it was 
not the first time his behaviour had been suggestive of excessive alcohol use. 
The incident brought disgrace upon Europa Plus and rendered it no longer 
attractive for potential cooperation. Even so, the key factor leading to the 
gradual marginalisation of Europa Plus was in fact the attitude of SLD’s 
leaders, who, unwilling to share the benefits of leadership, consistently refused 
to cooperate with the Movement. In this context, it is worth taking a closer look 
at the election strategies that both parties adopted. In its spots, SLD tried to 
convince voters that PO and PiS were not significantly different from each 
other, and that it was only their party that was able to bring new ideas to public 
discourse and policy-making. In the opinion of SLD, PO came to resemble PiS 
in 2014 when its leader, Donald Tusk, chose to communicate with the public by 
means of rhetoric that had previously been employed mainly by PiS: his 
campaign speeches now featured the threat of war posed to East-Central Europe 
by Russia.  
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Europa Plus advertised itself as a broad political and social initiative 
based on modern values. This, however, did not prevent it from launching a 
negative campaign; it paid more attention to PiS, rather than PO, and focused on 
pointing out the backwardness of its programme and the party’s aspiration to 
turn Poland into a police state.  
Among the less significant committees, the election campaign of Janusz 
Korwin-Mikke’s New Right (KNP) deserves a special mention, as this party 
was the only representative of what might be called “Euroreject”6 or hard 
Euroscepticism7. The campaign was executed mainly through meetings with 
electors as well as via the Internet. The party’s spot levelled sharp criticism at 
the EU for undergoing a continuous process of bureaucratisation and 
systematically violating civil liberties. In their own words, KNP’s deputies took 
their chance to win seats in the European Parliament so as to bring down the EU 
from the inside, a rhetoric that strongly resembles the one advocated by the 
Polish party League of Polish Families (LPR) during the 2004 European 
Parliament election campaign8. 
As most political parties are focused on advertising in the mass media, it 
is worth presenting at this point the broadcasting time that selected committees 
received by public and privately-owned television channels, which was the 
subject of a study carried out by the Public Media Department at the National 
Broadcasting Council’s Office (a constitutional body responsible for monitoring 
whether free speech, the right to information, and public interests are respected 
on radio and television). The study monitored television programmes broadcast 
during the two weeks leading up to the beginning of pre-election silence, i.e., 
between 10 May and 23 May, 12 a.m9. The conclusion we may derive from the 
data given in Table 2 (see the Appendix) is that public and privately-owned TV 
channels privileged the main political actors. However, this lack of balance 
differed across particular cases. To summarize, it could be argued that the 
election campaign was not a particularly eventful one. Even so, a single 
initiative of PiS deserves to be mentioned at this point, as it added a touch of 
piquancy to the competition. In an ironic move, after they realised that PO’s 
                                                 
6
 Petr Kopecký, Cas Mudde, “The Two Sides of Euroscepticism: Party Positions on 
European Integration in East Central Europe”, European Union Politics, vol. 3, no. 3, 
2002, pp. 302, 303. 
7
 Paul Taggart, Aleks Szczerbiak, “Contemporary Euroscepticism in the Party Systems of 
the European Union Candidate States of Central and Eastern Europe”, European Journal 
of Political Research, vol. 43,issue 1, 2003, p. 3. 
8
 Piotr Sula, “Euro-Scepticism in the Party System of Poland”, in Břetislav Dančák, Petr 
Fiala, Vít Hloušek (eds.), Evropeizace. Nové téma politologického výzkumu, Masarykova 
Univerzita v Brně, Brno, 2005, pp. 374-375. 
9
 Kampania wyborcza do Parlamentu Europejskiego w głównych wydaniach serwisów 
informacyjnych TVP SA, TVN, Polsat, TV Trwam, TV Republika i Superstacja w okresie 
10-23 maja 2014 r. Wnioski z monitoringu, (http://www.krrit.gov.pl/Data/Files/_public/ 
Portals/0/kontrola/wybory/departament-mediow-publicznych.pdf, accessed on 13 October 
2014). 
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spot was partially shot in the halls belonging to the Chancellery of the Prime 
Minister of Poland, the representatives of PiS applied to the Chancellery for 
renting the very same venue so that they could film their own spots there. 
Arguably, this was aimed to show that the prime minister had abused his 
privileges while campaigning for power.  
 
 
Election Results  
 
The EP elections were held on 25 May 2014, between 7 a.m. and 9 p.m. 
Despite Polish enthusiasm for the European project, voter turnout remained 
rather low (23.82%). Low levels of participation in EP elections have recently 
become an East Central Europe trademark, and whereas Polish turnout was 
higher than in countries such as the Czech Republic (18.20%) and Slovakia 
(13.05%), it was still significantly lower compared to other countries in the 
region: Lithuania (47.35%), Latvia (36.52%), and Bulgaria (35.84%)10. The 
number of valid votes was 7.297.490, whereas the number of wasted votes 
amounted to 228.005, i.e., 3.12% of the total number of the vote cast (for detailed 
results see the Appendix, Table 3). The turnout in the 2014 EP election in 
Poland was similar to that in the 2004 (20.87%) and 2009 elections (24.53%)11. 
With 32.13% of support, PO claimed yet another election victory, being 
however only slightly ahead of PiS (31.78%). Much to the surprise of observers, 
KNP received 7.15% of valid votes and came ahead of PSL (6.80%), which had 
been part of the ruling coalition. Similarly surprising was the low score of 
Europa Plus Your Movement: it received a mere 3.58% of support, a result 
which failed to achieve the minimal barrier clause that would secure the 
committee’s representation in the European Parliament. As a result, SLD, with 
9.44% of votes, became the party chosen to represent centre-left circles.  
As a consequence of the European elections, the Polish political parties 
joined the ranks of the political groups in the European Parliament to which 
they already belonged: PO, along with its coalition partner PSL, became 
members of the European People’s Party; PiS – European Conservatives and 
Reformists; and SLD – Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats. As of 
yet (November 2014), only KNP, a new political party in the parliament, does 
not have an affiliation with a European party family. It is believed that French 
National Front might become an ally of KNP. However, the talks of these 
parties have so far proven fruitless. 
                                                 
10
 For further details concerning the EP elections turnout across the member states see 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/turnout.html, accessed on 19 
November 2014. 
11
 Edward Olszewski, “Partie Polityczne i społeczeństwo w wyborach do Parlamentu 
Europejskiego 2004 roku”, Athenaeum, vol. 14-15, 2006, p. 71; Józef M. Fiszer, “Wstęp”, 
in Inka Słodowska, Magdalena Dołbakowska (eds.), Eurowybory 2009. Kandydaci i 
programy, Instytut Studiów Politycznych Pan, Warszawa, 2010, p. 28.  
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Concluding Remarks:  
In the Aftermath of the Electoral Race 
 
In conclusion, I would like to consider the view, which is widely 
accepted among political scientists, that the elections to the European 
Parliament are second-order elections. If one were to measure the importance of 
individual elections by voter turnout, the 2014 European election in Poland 
would certainly be a case in point. However, its results, which also confirmed 
that the Polish electoral system had developed a stable pattern of competition, 
led to far-reaching consequences for several parties. As it turned out, two of the 
recently established right-wing parties that aimed to compete for the votes with 
PiS, that is, Zbigniew Ziobro’s Solidary Poland (SP; established by an ex-
member of PiS) and Jarosław Gowin’s Poland Together (established by an ex-
member of PO), were to acknowledge the supremacy of the party led by 
Jarosław Kaczyński (that is, PiS). As a consequence of that defeat, both parties 
decided to cooperate with PiS during local government elections that are to be 
held in November 2014.  
More salient changes were found to affect the left part of the competition. 
As has been mentioned above, the battle over the centre-left electorate was won 
by SLD. As a result of an internal crisis that afflicted Your Movement after the 
crushing defeat in the European elections, several members of the parliamentary 
group left the club of Your Movement, two of whom were immediately 
embraced by SLD. 
As for Janusz Korwin-Mikke’s party, it is difficult to assess its chances of 
becoming a permanent element of the Polish party system. According to an 
election exit poll conducted on the day of the election by the Ipsos research 
group, which was commissioned by public television and the privately-owned 
TVN, KNP won the greatest support among the youngest members of the 
electorate – 43% of its supporters were aged between 18 and 25 years, while 
31.1% were aged 26 to 39. Men constituted a sweeping majority of the party’s 
supporters – 74.2%, as opposed to 25.8% of women. Even so, the support 
received from female voters came as a surprise given the party leader’s highly 
controversial views concerning women12. Janusz Korwin-Mikke is doubtless a 
valuable asset to his party. In the long run, however, his actions are likely to 
meet with the disapproval of voters, as even the most avid enthusiasts of 
scandalising behaviour in politics may turn away from violence, however low-
level. This is a reference to an infamous situation when, while waiting for a 
meeting at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs soon after the results of the European 
                                                 
12
 “Zwycięstwo Korwina. Kto na niego głosował?”, Newsweek Polska, 26 May 2014, 
http://polska.newsweek.pl/janusz-korwin-mikke-wynik-eurowyborow-sukces-nowej-
prawicy-newsweek,artykuly,286860,1.html, accessed on 14 October 2014. 
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election were made public, Korwin-Mikke slapped ex-Minister of 
Administration and Digitization, Michał Boni, in the face. The aggressor, who 
was eventually denied entry to the meeting, commented on the event that long 
ago he had promised Boni that he would slap him in the face for not being 
apologised to. In Korwin-Mikke’s opinion, he deserved an apology after Boni 
officially claimed him to be wrong in stating that Boni had collaborated with the 
security services in the past. Korwin-Mikke felt deeply hurt by his words, 
especially that several years later Boni admitted to having collaborated with the 
secret police of the People’s Republic of Poland.  
The 2014 European elections opened up an election marathon in Poland. 
Still in 2014, the country is holding local government election, while in 2015 – 
parliamentary and presidential elections. The following year will show whether 
the trends established in the 2014 European election (marginalisation of Your 
Movement and growing importance of KNP) will also hold in future elections. 
It is with some degree of certainty, however, that one can expect both PiS and 
PO to retain their dominant position on the Polish political scene. 
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APPENDIX 
  
Table 1 
Support for Electoral Committees before the 2014 Election  
to the European Parliament in Poland (March-May 2014) 
 
The candidate of which 
electoral committee would 
you support in the 
upcoming elections? 
Respondents’ answers according to polls 
March 2014 
(N=410) 
April 2014 
(N=380) 
April/May 2014 
(N=427) 
May 2014 
(N=418) 
In per cent 
Zbigniew Ziobro’s 
Solidary Poland  
2  1  2  1 
National Movement 1 0 0 0 
Democratic Left Alliance 
– Labour Union 
7  6  6  8 
Law and Justice 22  21  20  21 
Europa Plus Your 
Movement 
3  2  2  2 
Jarosław Gowin’s Poland 
Together  
4  4  1  2 
Janusz Korwin-Mikke’s 
New Right 
4  6  6  4 
Civic Platform 24  29  21  26 
Polish Peasant Party 6  4  3  5 
Other electoral committee 2  0  1  2 
Undecided  24  27  38  30 
Source: Wybory do Parlamentu Europejskiego, Survey Report, No. 71/2014, CBOS, Warszawa 
 2014, p. 5. 
 
Table 2 
Total Airtime for Broadcasting Election Materials in Main News Programmes  
on Public Television and the Two Largest Privately Owned TV Channels 
 
Electoral 
committee 
Total airtime 
in main news 
programmes 
on public 
television 
Total airtime in main 
news programmes on 
the privately-owned 
channel TVN 
Total airtime in 
main news 
programmes on the 
privately-owned 
channel Polsat 
Civic Platform 45 minutes, 
16 seconds 17 minutes, 27 seconds 
17 minutes, 26 
seconds 
Law and Justice 44 minutes, 
39 seconds 22 minutes, 32 seconds 
18 minutes, 49 
seconds 
Europa Plus 
Your Movement 
27 minutes, 
27 seconds 16 minutes, 31 seconds 
06 minutes, 45 
seconds 
Democratic Left 
Alliance – 
Labour Union 
23 minutes, 
18 seconds 8 minutes, 19 seconds 3 minutes, 48 seconds 
Janusz Korwin-
Mikke’s New 
17 minutes, 
31 seconds 5 minutes, 12 seconds 2 minutes, 05 seconds 
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Right 
Zbigniew 
Ziobro’s 
Solidary Poland 
15 minutes, 
20 seconds 3 minutes, 01 second 3 minutes 31 seconds 
Polish Peasant 
Party 
13 minutes, 
47 seconds 2 minutes, 21 seconds 1 minute, 38 seconds 
Jarosław 
Gowin’s Poland 
Together  
11 minutes, 
39 seconds 1 minute, 23 seconds 1 minute, 52 seconds 
National 
Movement 
5 minutes, 46 
seconds 0 minutes 0 minutes, 19 seconds 
Source: Kampania wyborcza do Parlamentu Europejskiego w głównych wydaniach 
serwisów informacyjnych TVP SA, TVN, Polsat, TV Trwam, TV Republika i Superstacja 
w okresie 10-23 maja 2014 r. Wnioski z monitoringu. Monitoring report 
(http://www.krrit.gov.pl/Data/Files/_public/Portals/0/kontrola/wybory/departament-
mediow-publicznych.pdf, accessed on 13 October 2014). 
 
Table 3 
Results of the European Election Held in Poland on 25 May 2014 
 
Electoral committee No. of valid 
votes 
Votes in % No. of seats 
 
Zbigniew Ziobro’s Solidary Poland  281.079 3.98 0 
National Movement 98.626 1.40 0 
Democratic Left Alliance – Labour 
Union 
667.319 9.44 5 
Law and Justice 2.246.870 31.78 19 
Europa Plus Your Movement 252.779 3.58 0 
Jarosław Gowin’s Poland Together  223.733 3.16 0 
Janusz Korwin-Mikke’s New Right 505.586 7.15 4 
Civic Platform 2.271.215 32.13 19 
Polish Peasant Party 480.846 6.80 4 
Other electoral committee 41.432 0.58 0 
Total   51 
Source: Polish Electoral Commission, www.pkw.gov.pl; own calculation in the case of 
other electoral committees on the basis of data published by PEC. Polish Electoral 
Commission, www.pkw.gov.pl; own calculation in the case of other electoral committees 
on the basis of data published by PEC. 
